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11. Introduction
Preserving intergenerational equity has become a worldwide political
concern and achieving sustainability is increasingly considered a rele-
vant social goal. Environmental policy is a central issue in the debate,
since resources depletion and environmental degradation are major
sources of intergenerational con°icts. In particular, prospects for over-
exploitation of productive natural resources represent a threat for the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Since Hotelling
(1931) seminal work, economic analysis has pointed out several poten-
tial sources of the problem: over-exploitation may result from market
incompleteness, excessive competition, myopic behavior, lacking mo-
tives for investment in natural preservation. Accordingly, public inter-
vention may be called for either restoring e±ciency (Toman, 1987) or
settling con°icts between intertemporal e±ciency and social optimality
(Howarth and Norgaard, 1990).1
In recent times, the attribution of property rights over natural re-
sources - as well as similar mechanisms allowing for market valuation
of environmental assets - gained much attention in the policy debate.
However, neither sustainability nor resource preservation are guaran-
teed when natural capital is private property. This result holds in
general equilibrium models with in¯nitely-lived agents (Pezzey, 1992),
and is furthermore valid when assuming sel¯sh agents with ¯nite life-
times (Mourmouras, 1993): market valuation of resource assets can
only limit the depletion rate to the extent that preserving natural
capital is pro¯table to agents currently alive. Consequently, achieving
intergenerational fairness requires a system of transfers that redis-
tributes income among generations: examples in the recent literature
on environmental economics include Mourmouras (1993), Marini and
Scaramozzino (1995), Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998), Krautkraemer
and Batina (1999), Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001).
The logic underlying most the above contributions is that of pursu-
ing intergenerational fairness while preserving intertemporal e±ciency,
and this typically implies to consider lump-sum transfers. However,
real-world policymaking is often constrained by institutional feasibility:
lump-sum taxes have limited application, and policies involving inter-
generational transfers likely need support of the constituency. Building
2on this point, we focus on the intergenerational e®ects of resource-
saving policies enacted through distortionary measures. Speci¯cally, we
pose the following question. Consider an economy with overlapping gen-
erations where agents live for two periods and privately-owned natural
capital is essential for production. Suppose that under laissez-faire the
economy is placed along a path implying individual welfare be declining
over time. Would sel¯sh agents agree on a system of intergenerational
transfers implying a higher degree of natural preservation?
This paper shows that, under credible pre-commitment, every new-
born generation supports distortionary taxation of natural capital in-
come for purely sel¯sh reasons, provided a critical condition on techno-
logical parameters is satis¯ed. More precisely, all agents strictly prefer
positive transfers in both periods of life, with respect to persistent
laissez-faire conditions, if the resource-share in production is su±ciently
high relative to the labor-share. The reason for this result is that higher
productivity of natural capital raises the after-tax yield from resource
assets: if the resource share is su±ciently high, the negative e®ect of
second-period taxation is more than o®set by the positive e®ect of
¯rst-period subsidies. Hence, if newborn agents are asked at birth to
sign a lifetime contract requiring them to choose either positive or zero
transfers in both periods of life, positive transfers are chosen - that is, a
higher degree of natural preservation is preferred to laissez-faire - when
the critical condition is satis¯ed.
After describing the welfare properties of lifetime contracts, we an-
alyze the intergenerational consequences of enforcing resource-saving
policies by discretionary intervention over an in¯nite time-horizon. The
welfare time-path obtained under laissez-faire is not Pareto-comparable
with that implied by permanent transfers: under resource-saving poli-
cies, resource owners at 'time zero' su®er a deadweight loss due to
initial taxation of natural capital. Similarly to Gale (1973), if the ¯rst
resource owner partially renounces to its claim over initial endowments,
the transmission of this credit forward in time yields welfare gains for
all successive generations.
Other interesting results concern with sustainability conditions: we
derive explicit conditions for non-declining lifetime utility with a pos-
itive rate of technological progress, also describing interrelations and
possible con°icts among alternative social goals.
32. The model
Our formal analysis draws on the Mourmouras (1993)-Krautkraemer
and Batina (1999) model. Mourmouras (1993) uses the overlapping-
generations setup to demonstrate that competition may lead to over-
exploitation of privately-owned renewable resources, and describes a
set of conservationist policies that implement the Rawlsian path, i.e.
policies that keep private welfare constant, at the highest feasible level,
across generations. A ¯rst major di®erence with respect to Mourmouras
(1993) is the aim of our analysis: we study the welfare properties of
distortionary transfers in order to ascertain whether, and under what
institutional circumstances, sel¯sh agents would agree on a higher rate
of natural preservation with respect to laissez-faire. Second, we focus
on the existence of situations where a distorted rate of resource use is
preferred to the laissez-faire rate, without assuming a predetermined
social objective: whether the distorted rate satis¯es sustainability cri-
teria - i.e. non-declining utility, conditions for zero-depletion, both or
none of the two - it depends on parameters, and is an ex-post problem.
Third, we study individual payo®s in a regime-contingent formulation,
in order to describe the potential support for transfers in each point in
time. Fourth, we include technological progress of the resource-saving
type in the model, which modi¯es the link between sustainability and
natural preservation, determining possible con°icts between alternative
social objectives.2
In line with recent literature, we de¯ne sustainable development as a
path implying non-decreasing welfare for future generations. The econ-
omy has an overlapping-generations structure, with each agent living
for two periods and enjoying utility from consumption when young (c)
and consumption when old (e). Population in period t consists of Nt
young and Nt¡1 old individuals, with a constant rate n of population
growth: Nt+1 = Nt (1 + n). Denoting by Ut the lifetime utility of an
agent born in period t, sustainability requires
Ut+1 (ct+1;e t+2) ¸ Ut (ct;e t+1); 8t 2 [0;1): (1)
Denoting by Rt the stock of natural resources available in the economy,
we also de¯ne no-depletion paths as those paths satisfying
Rt+1 ¸ Rt; 8t 2 [0;1): (2)
4Prospects for sustainability and natural preservation depend on the in-
tergenerational distribution of entitlements, which a®ects the time-path
of resource use, and in turn, the production frontier and consumption
possibilities of yet to born generations. In this regard, we assume a
grandfathering process µ al aKrautkraemer and Batina (1999): at the
beginning of period t, the whole stock of natural resources in the econ-
omy Rt is held by old agents. Part of R is used as natural capital in
production (X), while the remaining stock constitutes resource assets
(A):
Rt = At + Xt: (3)
Old agents sell resource assets At to young agents at unit price qt,
and receive a gross marginal rent pt for each unit of natural capital
Xt supplied to the ¯rm producing the consumption good. Prices and
marginal rents are expressed in terms of the consumption good, and
per-young quantities of resource assets and natural capital are denoted
by at = At=Nt and xt = Xt=Nt, respectively. While natural capital goes
destroyed in the production process, resource assets sold to newborn
generations are brought forward in time: qtat can thus be interpreted as
the investment of each young agent in natural preservation. Assuming
that between t and t+1 the natural resource grows at constant regen-
eration rate ", the natural stock available at the beginning of period
t + 1 equals
Rt+1 =( 1+")(Rt ¡ Xt) = (1 + ")At: (4)
Only young agents work, supplying inelastically one unit of labor ser-
vices. The consumption good is produced by means of natural capital





mt = mt¡1 (1 + ±); (6)
where Yt is aggregate output, Nt equals total labor units provided by
currently young, and mt is a process enhancing the productivity of






wt =( 1 ¡ ®)yt =( 1¡ ®)m®
t x®
t ; (8)
5where y = Y=N is output per worker.
Intergenerational transfers take the following form: the investment
in preservation of young agents is subsidized by taxing the income
from natural capital of old agents, and ¯scal authorities keep balanced
budget in each period. Formally,
ct = wt ¡ qt (1 ¡ dt)at; (9)
et+1 =[ pt+1 (1 ¡ ¿t+1)xt+1 + qt+1at+1](1+n); (10)
pt¿tXt = qtAtdt; (11)
yt = ct + et (1 + n)
¡1 : (12)
Equations (9) and (10) represent budget constraints faced by each
individual born in period t, where d is the subsidy rate on invest-
ments in preservation, and ¿ is the tax rate on natural capital income.4
Equation (11) is the government budget constraint, and equation (12)
is the aggregate resource constraint of the economy. Agents are ho-
mogeneous and have logarithmic preferences: lifetime utility is Ut =
logct + ¯ loget+1, where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the individual discount factor.
Equilibrium in the resource market requires
qt = pt (1 ¡ ¿t) (13)
in each period.5 The consumer problem consists of choosing ct and
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: (14)
The temporary equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the
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t+1 =( vt+1=vt) for the generic variable vt. Note that in equation





Our analysis proceeds as follows: ¯rst, we derive conditions for sus-
tainability and no-depletion in a laissez-faire economy; second, we de-
scribe how resource-saving policies - i.e. ¯scal measures implying a
higher degree of resource preservation with respect to laissez-faire -
can be implemented through intergenerational transfers.
2.1. The laissez-faire economy
Setting tax-subsidy rates equal to zero, it follows from (15) that the
natural capital-resource asset ratio is constant over time:
zt =
®(1 + ¯)
¯ (1 ¡ ®)
=~ z for all t. (20)
The laissez-faire economy exhibits the knife-edge property: setting zt+1 =
zt =~ z in equation (18), the growth rate of output per worker is constant
over time, and it can be positive, negative, or equal to zero, depending
on parameters. With respect to Mourmouras (1993) and Krautkrae-
mer and Batina (1999), the presence of technological progress crucially
modi¯es the link between resources depletion and sustainability (all
proofs are in Appendix):
PROPOSITION 1. A necessary and su±cient condition for no-depletion
in the laissez-faire economy is
~ z · ": (21)
PROPOSITION 2. A necessary and su±cient condition for sustain-
ability in the laissez-faire economy is












where ° = ¯¡1 ¡ 1 is the individual pure rate of time preference.
7Expression (23) is conceptually analogous to the long-run sustain-
ability condition holding in economies with in¯nitely-lived agents: in
the standard capital-resource model, optimal consumption per capita
is asymptotically non-decreasing if the social discount rate does not
exceed the sum of the rates of technical progress and natural regener-
ation (Valente, 2005). Similarly, (23) shows that sustainability obtains
provided the joint e®ect of ± and " is not o®set by the impatience to
consume out (°).
Whether sustainability conditions are more restrictive than condi-
tions for no-depletion depends on the rates of technological progress
and population growth: assuming " and n strictly positive,
LEMMA 3. If ±<n , the laissez-faire economy may exhibit no-depletion
together with unsustainability; if ±>n , the economy may exhibit re-
source depletion together with sustainability; if ± = n, the economy
displays either (i) unsustainability with positive depletion, or (ii) sus-
tainability with no-depletion.
Lemma 3 can be veri¯ed by means of Figure 1, which describes
the interrelations, and possible con°icts, between resource preservation
and sustainability: in particular, it shows that no-depletion per se does
not guarantee sustained utility. By (21) and (22), the sustainability
threshold zsus = ½ increases with ±, while the no-depletion locus zndp =
" is horizontal in the (±, z) plane: consequently, di®erent combinations
of parameters may determine sustainability, no-depletion, both, or none
of the two. Moreover, it follows from (21) and (22) that
COROLLARY 4. If ~ z = " and ± = n, then
Ut+1 = Ut and Rt+1 = Rt; 8t 2 [0;1): (24)
The situation described by (24) satis¯es most used notions of sus-
tainable development: future generations do not experience declining
utility (standard de¯nition), each generation enjoys the same welfare
level (Rawlsian intergenerational equity), and natural capital as such
is preserved over time (strong sustainability). This very special case is
represented by point S in Figure 1.
8Figure 1. The knife-edge model: sustainability and no-depletion conditions for
given values of n, ", and ®. By (21) and (22), in the laissez-faire economy no-depletion
obtains for a couple of values (~ z;±) below the locus z
ndp, while sustainability obtains
for a couple of values (~ z;±) below the locus z
sus.
2.2. The economy with transfers
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that if the economy is unsustainable under
laissez-faire, a ceteris paribus reduction in zt due to intergenerational
transfers will bring the economy towards the sustainability threshold.
Balanced budget policies with positive taxes a®ect the gap (zt ¡ ~ z)
unambiguously: from (15) and (20), the natural capital-resource asset
ratio at time t equals
zt =~ z (1 ¡ ¿t)(1¡ dt): (25)
Assume that the policymaker aims at achieving a pre-determined level
z0: substituting (25) in the government budget constraint (11), the
target level zt = z0 is obtained by setting dt = d0 and ¿t = ¿0, where
d0 =
~ z ¡ z0
1+~ z
and ¿0 =
~ z ¡ z0
~ z (1 + z0)
: (26)
9Expressions (26) allow to derive the critical levels of ¿t and dt needed
to obtain the desired depletion rate. For example, by Proposition 1 the
resource stock is constant over time if zt = " for each t: setting z0 = " in
(26) we obtain the critical rates to obtain zero depletion of the natural
stock. By the same reasoning,
LEMMA 5. Setting dt =
~ z¡½
1+~ z and ¿t =
~ z¡½
~ z(1+½) for each t 2 [0;1)
implies zt = ½ and Ut+1 = Ut for each t 2 [0;1).
More generally, any ¯scal intervention that keeps zt below the laissez-
faire level ~ z constitutes a resource-saving policy: lowering the natural
capital-resource assets ratio is associated to lower rates of resource use
in production (or equivalently, to a higher degree of preservation). By
(26), positive tax-subsidy rates (¿0 > 0, d0 > 0) are always associated
to resource-saving policies (z0 < ~ z).
3. Resource-saving transfers and lifetime welfare
We now compare the e®ects of laissez-faire and transfers on individual
payo®s in each period: in this regime-contingent formulation, individ-
ual payo®s represent the potential political support for resource-saving
measures, as if agents were asked to choose between laissez-faire and
positive transfers in each period. Assuming that each newborn agent
takes the history of previous regimes as given, we show that positive
transfers in both periods of life may yield higher private payo®s with
respect to life-persistent laissez-faire (zero taxes and subsidies in both
periods) if a precise condition on technological parameters is ful¯lled.
The payo® associated to persistent transfers is however dominated by a
third option: as intuitive, agents would be made better-o® by experienc-
ing positive transfers in the ¯rst period of life, and laissez-faire in the
second, because such regime shift allows to avoid taxation. This implies
that resource-saving policies would be supported if the government had
access to a commitment device which we call lifetime contract.
103.1. Regime-contingent payoffs
Denote by ´t the outcome of an unspeci¯ed political process: ´t is
a °ag indicating whether laissez-faire or resource-saving transfers are
implemented in period t:
´t =
(
0 , zt =~ z (laissez-faire)
1 , zt = z0 < ~ z (res-saving transfers)
(27)
The individual payo® Vt of each agent born in t ¸ 0 depends on the
two outcomes realized during her lifetime (´t and ´t+1) as well as on
















Assuming that agents cannot modify previous outcomes, Ht is taken
as given and the individual payo® of every agent born in T ¸ 0 can be















where ­T is taken as given at T. Suppressing argument H for sim-









VT (0;0), VT (0;1), VT (1;0), VT (1;1) on the basis of (29). We will refer
to VT (0;0) and VT (1;1) as to payo®s yielded by life-persistent regimes
(´t = ´t+1). In the Appendix, we show that for any value of z0 < ~ z,
VT (0;0) >V T (0;1) (30)
VT (1;0) >V T (1;1) (31)
in each period T ¸ 0. On the one hand, this result is intuitive: in-
equalities (30) and (31) imply that if agents could modify ´T+1 while
taking ´T as given, they would have an incentive to avoid taxation in
the second period of life. On the other hand, (30) and (31) do not rule
out situations where sel¯sh agents would prefer persistent transfers to
persistent laissez-faire: VT (1;1) and VT (0;0) cannot be ranked a priori,
so it is possible to have the interesting case
VT (1;0) >V T (1;1) >V T (0;0) >V T (0;1): (32)
The explicit condition to obtain (32) is derived below:

















Condition (33) is necessary and su±cient to have VT (1;1) >V T (0;0),
that is, private agents strictly prefer life-persistent transfers to persis-
tent laissez-faire. For a given discount factor ¯, inequality (33) de¯nes
the set of all possible combinations of ® and z0 implying VT (1;1) >
VT (0;0). This set can be characterized by de¯ning the policy index
¹ =( 1¡ ¿)(1¡ d) ´ z0=~ z: (34)
Index ¹ is ¯xed by ¯scal authorities, as it results from the level of tax-
subsidy rates, and ¹<1 means that ¯scal authorities enact resource-
saving policies (this is equivalent to assume that ¯scal authorities set
z0 = ¹~ z, where the natural capital-resource asset ratio equals the de-
sired fraction ¹ of the laissez-faire level ~ z). As shown in the Appendix,






¯ (1 ¡ ®)+¹®(1 + ¯)
¯ (1 ¡ ®)+®(1 + ¯)
¸®+2®¯
; (35)
where ¹ is a choice variable independent of ®. From (35), the sign
of @©=@® is ambiguous because the derivative of the term in square
brackets is negative for ¹<1. Fixing ¹ and ¯, it can be easily veri¯ed
with numerical substitutions that the gap function ©
¡
®;¹ ¹; ¹ ¯
¢
has an
inverted-U shape with respect to ®: imposing © = 0 determines two
values of the resource share, ®1 and ®2, with © > 0 when ® 2 (®1;® 2).
Consequently, we have V (1;1) >V(0;0) for relatively high and rel-
atively low values of ®: as shown in Figure 2.a, if the resource-share
is either below ®1, or above ®2, the gap function © assumes negative
values.
Numerical examples suggest that ®1 is very close to zero: it is di±-
cult that the resource share lies within the interval (0;® 1), whereas
having ®2 <®<1 appears plausible; condition (33) can thus be
restated, with good approximation, by saying that V (1;1) >V(0;0)
provided the resource share is su±ciently high (®>® 2). The economic
interpretation of this result is that if natural capital is highly produc-
tive, the positive e®ect of ¯rst-period subsidies more than compensates
12the loss due to second-period taxation: the higher is ®, the higher is
the after-tax yield received by the old when selling resource assets to
the newborn.
Critical levels ®1 and ®2 are a®ected by the policy target ¹: Figure
2.b shows that the lower is ¹, the lower is ®1 and the higher is ®2.
This result can be interpreted as follows. As explained in section 2.2,
the lower is z0, the higher is the degree of natural preservation implied
by resource-saving transfers. However, from the agents point of view,
the lower is z0 the higher is the private cost of transfers: hence, if ¯scal
authorities set z0 relatively close to the laissez-faire value ~ z (i.e. ¹ ! 1)
the private cost of transfers is relatively small, and condition (33) is
likely to be met; conversely, if the policymaker is more inclined towards
natural preservation (¹ ! 0), persistent transfers are more demanding
and condition (33) is more restrictive. Being ®1 close to zero, this result
can be reasserted as follows: the higher is the degree of preservation
associated to positive transfers, the higher is the lower bound (®2) for
the resource share to have V (1;1) >V(0;0).
Figure 2. Graph (a): ¯xing ¯ and ¹, the gap © = V (0;0)¡V (1;1) is drawn as
a function of ®. Condition (33) de¯nes two intervals, (0;® 1) and (®2;1), over which
the value of ® is compatible with V (1;1) >V(0;0). Graph (b): ¯xing ¯, the gap
function © = V (0;0)¡V (1;1) is drawn as a parametric function for di®erent values
of ¹ = ¹1;:::;¹4, with ¹1 >¹ 2 >¹ 3 >¹ 4.
133.2. Lifetime contracts and discretionary policies
It follows from Proposition 6 that if agents are asked at birth to sign a
lifetime contract requiring them to choose between persistent transfers
and persistent laissez-faire, every agent born at t ¸ 0 chooses resource-
saving transfers. With respect to this result, three main points should
be emphasized. First, lifetime contracts embody a notion of credible
pre-commitment: if the technological condition is ful¯lled, agents prefer
positive transfers provided that no regime switch is allowed during the
life-cycle. Second, private agents would not enforce such contracts by
themselves as no compensation is received by resource owners at t =0 :
this is the '¯rst father problem' discussed below. Third, whether a
sustainable path would be supported by means of lifetime contracts it
depends on the whole set of parameters. Suppose that the laissez-faire
economy is unsustainable, and that a lifetime contract asks newborn
agents to choose between ~ z>½and z0 = ½. If the technological condi-
tion is satis¯ed in this case, then lifetime contracts support a constant
utility path. However, as shown in Figure 2.b, the lower is ¹ = z0=~ z
the more restrictive is the technological condition: hence, the range of
values of ® compatible with V (1;1) >V(0;0) is limited if ~ z is very high
relative to ½, whereas conditions for an 'agreement on sustainability'
are less restrictive if ~ z is relatively close to ½.6
Our results have interesting implications when considering discre-
tionary policies over an in¯nite time-horizon. Assume that ¯scal au-
thorities may choose the sequence of intertemporal allocations from
period zero onward. The individual ¯rst-best payo® V (1;0) cannot
be assigned to every generation, because implementing it in each t
is not possible: if Vt = Vt (1;0) then Vt+1 = Vt+1 (1;0) is unfeasible.
Hence, from a social-planning perspective, the relevant inequality in
ranking (32) is the central one, V (1;1) >V(0;0), which refers to
life-persistent regimes. This in turn suggests to investigate the welfare
e®ects of implementing the two sequences of lifetime contracts




¿t = ¿0;d t = d0ª1
t=0
through discretionary measures; we refer to these sequences as to per-
manent laissez-faire and permanent transfers, respectively.
Having assumed grandfathering, the resource stock at time zero is
entirely held by those old at time zero. In this scenario, a typical ¯rst
14father problem arises with respect to resource-saving policies: suppose
that inequality (33) is ful¯lled, and assume that ¯scal authorities im-
plement permanent transfers, that is, zt = z0 < ~ z for t =0 ;:::;1.
While every agent born at, or after time zero gains from this policy,
initial subsidies must be ¯nanced by those old at t = 0. Hence, welfare
improvements due to permanent transfers pertain to all agents, with
the exception of the ¯rst generation of 'fathers'.
On the one hand, the ¯rst father problem implies that, considering
the time-path of private welfare over all generations, permanent laissez-
faire and permanent transfers cannot be Pareto-ranked. On the other
hand, resource-saving policies recall the logic of Gale-type intergenera-
tional transfers: considering a two-generations pure exchange economy,
Gale (1973) showed that the ¯rst generation can raise future welfare
by renouncing part of its claim over the endowment to the bene¯t of
the second generation, which in turn transmits a claim to its successor,
and so on. In our setting, with fundamental di®erences duly taken into
account,7 permanent resource-saving transfers work in a similar way:
the initial tax ¿0p0X0 amounts at the share of claims over natural
capital not received by the ¯rst owner, and subsidies to the newborn
bring the associated credit forward in time. Clearly, enacting permanent
transfers involves a paternalistic action at time zero, as no generation
would sel¯shly make the initial gift: readapting Gale's (1973) argument
to our model, resource-saving transfers begin after the economy
"has been running along for some time in the [no-transfers] equi-
librium but at time t = 0 some of the old people realize that if
they are willing to give up ever so little of their second-period con-
sumption the economy in the future will move up toward [higher
welfare for future generations]. (...) If this altruistic scenario sounds
too unrealistic, one can instead imagine a central authority which
levies an income tax on the old people in period zero and then sells
this income back to the young." (ibid., p.29).
Alternatively, one can imagine the same process in a privatization
scenario, where natural resources previously owned by the State are
sold at lower-than-e±ciency price to young generations in period zero,
and permanent transfers are then implemented. In this case, the ini-
tial selling price (determined by the government) is equivalent to a
proportional subsidy at time zero, implying a deadweight loss for the
15public owner.8 Even here, taxing natural capital incomes of all suc-
cessive generations would ¯nd justi¯cation in the argument of lifetime
contracts.
It should be emphasized that the potential support for distortionary
transfers in our model is driven by purely sel¯sh motives. In this regard,
our analysis is close to the view that intergenerational exchange need
not be linked to parental altruism, as recently argued by Boldrin and
Rustichini (2000) and Rangel (2003). The general questions asked by
these authors is: why should present generations invest in assets that
are valuable only to future ones? Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and
Rangel (2003) use game-theoretical arguments to show that positive
transfers may arise as voting equilibria when intergenerational altruism
is absent.9 In particular, Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) show that pay-
as-you-go social security can be voted into existence by the majority,
because the reduction in current saving implied by taxation raises fu-
ture returns on capital, thus compensating the negative e®ect of pension
¯nancing. Recalling Proposition 6, our main result hinges on a similar
interest-rate e®ect, which is however reversed due to the father-to-son
scheme we have assumed.
4. Conclusions
This paper analyzed the welfare properties of distortionary transfers in
a growth model with overlapping generations and privately-owned nat-
ural capital. In this framework, Mourmouras (1993) and Krautkraemer
and Batina (1999) have shown that unsustainability and resources de-
pletion are likely an outcome of excessive competition. We have shown
that implementing father-to-son transfers through proportional taxes
and subsidies brings a higher degree of resource preservation with re-
spect to laissez-faire. The main result is that if individuals are credibly
pre-committed, all newborn agents prefer positive transfer to laissez-
faire conditions provided the resource-share in production is su±ciently
high relative to the labor-share. This result hinges on the assumption
that private agents earn income from selling resource assets in the
second period of life: when natural capital productivity is su±ciently
high, private gains from ¯rst-period subsidies more than compensate
the loss due to second-period taxation. Hence, if the critical condi-
16tion on parameters is satis¯ed, resource-saving transfers are suitable to
protect the welfare of future generations, and are supported by new-
born agents for purely sel¯sh reasons. Implementing resource-saving
policies through discretionary intervention implies a welfare time-path
not Pareto-comparable with that obtained under laissez-faire, because
resource owners at time zero su®er a deadweight loss due to taxation
of the initial stock. Similarly to Gale (1973), if the ¯rst resource owner
partially renounces to its claim over initial endowments, the transmis-
sion of this credit forward in time yields welfare gains for all successive
generations.
Appendix
The consumer problem. By (3), (13) and (4), the second-period in-
dividual constraint (10) can be rewritten as et+1 = qt+1 (1 + ")at;which
can be substituted in (9) to obtain
ct = wt ¡
qt (1 ¡ dt)et+1
qt+1 (1 + ")
: (A1)
The individual problem consists of choosing ct and et+1 in order to
maximize lifetime utility subject to (A1): ¯rst order conditions for
an interior solution imply (14). Substituting equilibrium prices (8)-
(7) and condition (14) in individual budget constraints (9) and (10),











(® + ¯)yt+1: (A3)
Deriving equation (15). Substituting et+1 = qt+1 (1 + ")at in
(A3) gives
at =
(1 + n)(® + ¯)
qt+1 (1 + ¯)(1+")
yt+1: (A4)
From (7) and (13), qt+1 = ®m®
t+1x®¡1
t+1 (1 ¡ ¿t+1) can be substituted in
(A4) to obtain
at =
(1 + n)(® + ¯)
®(1 + ¯)(1+")(1¡ ¿t+1)
xt+1: (A5)
























where (A6) is the optimality condition (14), and (A7) is implied by





(1 + n)(® + ¯)(1¡ dt)






















¯ (1 ¡ ®)(1+")(1¡ ¿t+1)
(1 + n)(® + ¯)(1¡ dt)(1¡ ¿t)
: (A10)
Substituting (A10) in (A5) gives eq.(15) in the text.
Deriving equations (16)-(18). Equations (16) and (17) are ob-
tained by substituting (15) in equations (3) and (4). By (5) and (6),
y = m®x® so that µy =[ ( 1+±)µx]
®, which implies (18) by virtue of
(17).
Proof of Proposition 1. It follows immediately from (16) that no-
depletion, i.e. µR ¸ 1, obtains if and only if inequality (21) is satis¯ed.
Proof of Proposition 2. Under laissez-faire zt+1 = zt =~ z, which
implies that Ut is proportional to yt (see equation (36) derived below).
Hence, satisfying the sustainability condition (1) in the laissez-faire
economy requires µy ¸ 1. Setting zt+1 = zt =~ z in (18) it follows that
µy ¸ 1 if and only if (22) is satis¯ed. Substituting (15) and ° = ¯¡1¡1
in (22) yields (23).
Proof of Lemma 3. Looking at Figure 1, Lemma 3 is proved as
follows: if n>0, the vertical intercept of the locus zsus is strictly below
the horizontal locus zndp. Therefore, it is possible to have a couple of
values ± = ±0 and ~ z = z0 such that 0 <± 0 <nand zsus <z 0 <
zndp (no-depletion and unsustainability). Viceversa, for high enough
±000 it is possible to have ± = ±000 and ~ z = z000 such that n<± 000 and
zndp <z 000 <z sus (depletion and sustainability). Finally, critical values
18of z for sustainability and no-depletion coincide (zndp = zsus) along
the vertical line ± = ±00 = n, so that we have either depletion and
unsustainability (~ z>z ndp = zsus ), or no-depletion and sustainability
(~ z · zndp = zsus). Corollary 4 is also veri¯ed by means of Figure 1,
and it follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2.
Deriving tax-subsidy rates in (26). Setting zt = z0, ¿t = ¿0 and










respectively. Substituting (A12) in (A11) gives ¿0 = d0
~ z(1¡d0), which can
be substituted back in (A11) to obtain d0 = ~ z¡z0
1+~ z , which is the subsidy
rate level in (26). The tax rate level in (26) then follows from ¿0 =
d0
~ z(1¡d0) as obtained above.






+ ¯ log(1 + n)
® + ¯
1+¯
+ logyt + ¯ logyt+1: (A13)
By (18), ¯ logyt+1 = ¯ logyt + ®¯ log
zt+1(1+½)








(1 + n)(® + ¯)
1+¯
+®¯ log
zt+1 (1 + ½)
zt (1 + zt+1)
+(1 + ¯)logyt:
(A14)








, implying that any







zt (1 + zt+1)
zt+1 (1 + ½)
¸ 1
¯
for each t 2 [0;1): (A15)
The dynamic rule (A15) can be satis¯ed by di®erent sequences of zt.
If the policymaker keeps zt constant over time, rule (A15) is however
satis¯ed if and only if zt = ½ for each t 2 [0;1), which proves Lemma
5.
Deriving expression (29). Given the initial endowment R0 ´


























r0m0 (1 + ½)
t
Qt¡1
j=0 (1 + zj)
(A18)
is a function of Ht and is therefore taken as given by the agent born









































yields expression (29) in the
text.
Deriving expressions (30) and (31). It follows from (29) that






































































Proof of Proposition 6. By (A20) and (A23), V (0;0) <V(1;1)

















20Substituting 1 + ~ z =
¯+®
¯(1¡®), this inequality reduces to (33). It follows
from (30) and (31) that if (33) is satis¯ed the only possible payo®
ranking is (32).
Deriving expression (35). From (A20) and (A23), the gap © =










Substituting z0 = ¹~ z and eq.(15) in the above expression yields equation
(35) in the text.
Notes
1 Bromley (1990) forcefully argues that environmental policy should not be re-
stricted to e±ciency targets. In line with this view is the idea that sustainable
development is a matter of intergenerational equity and, once the social objective
incorporates fairness concerns, e±ciency per se does not guarantee socially optimal
outcomes (Howarth, 1991; Howarth and Norgaard, 1990).
2 All the above di®erences also apply with respect to Kraukraemer and Batina
(1999), who consider a non-constant rate of natural regeneration in a Mourmouras
(1993) setting.
3 A positive rate of resource-augmenting technical progress may thought of as
resulting from the development of new resource-saving techniques that become
available over time.
4 The population growth rate appears in (10) because e is individual consumption
of the old, whereas x and a represent per young quantities: aggregate consumption
at time t + 1 equals et+1Nt = pt+1 (1 ¡ ¿t+1)Xt+1 + qt+1At+1:
5 Equation (13) is a standard no-arbitrage condition requiring that resource own-
ers are indi®erent at the margin between alternative uses of the natural stock R: net
marginal rents from natural capital must equal net marginal returns from resource
asset sales.
6 This point can be clari¯ed by means of Figure 2.b: assume that ½ = ¹2~ z, the
laissez-faire rate is ~ z>¹ 1~ z>¹ 2~ z, and the resource share equals ® =¹ ®. In this
case, newborn agents would agree on 'light' resource-saving policies z
0 = ¹1~ z, but
would not agree on the 'more demanding' sustainable policy z
0 = ¹2~ z = ½, because
the resource share ¹ ® is too low. Assume instead ½ = ¹1~ z and ® =¹ ®: in this case,
newborn agents would agree on the sustainable program z
0 = ¹1~ z = ½.
7 In Gale (1973), the government leans back after taxing the ¯rst generation, and
intergenerational exchange (equivalent to lump-sum transfers) arises on voluntary
basis given the absence of capital. In our model, welfare gains hinge on the productive
21role of natural capital, so that improvements (i) occur only if the technological
condition is satis¯ed, and (ii) derive from transfers that distort the rate of resource
use in production.
8 Unless sterilized by means of alternative ¯scal instruments, the public welfare
loss would again fall on the currently old in some form, depending on the regime ex-
perienced before period zero. In this regard, relaxing the balanced-budget hypothesis
suggests a role for public debt: bond issuance at time zero allows to ¯nance initial
subsidies, and the government may smooth service repayments over time according
to a calibrated ¯scal rule. Whether similar rules for intergenerational ¯scal fairness
are compatible with natural preservation and political support is an interesting topic
that might deserve further research.
9 Rangel (2003) shows that positive expenditures in goods that only bene¯t the
elderly (such as social security) are necessary to achieve an equilibrium with e±cient
investment in goods that bene¯t future generations (such as clean environment and
education).
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